

Message Text

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12
ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ADP-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

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R 23100)Z AUG 73 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7480
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY SNAAA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T KUWAIT 3059

BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR SA KU TC
SUBJ: SAUDI/KUWAIT AND SAUDI/UAE RELATIONS

SUMMARY: SAUDI SECURITY CHIEF ADHAM BROUGHT MESSAGE TO GOK
FROM FAISAL STRESSING IMPORTANCE OF SAUDI-KUWAITI RELATIONS AND
NEED FOR BETTER COORDINATION BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES. ADHAM RECEPTIVE
TO IDEA OF EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN UAE

AND SAUDI ARABIA. ACTION REQUESTED: DEPARTMENT LOOK FOR (A)

FORMULA FOR SAUDI RECOGNITION OF UAE WHICH WOULD NOT PREJUDICE
RESPECTIVE SAUDI AND ABU DHABI POSITIONS ON OBRDER DISPUTE AND
(B) PRECEDENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RECOGNITION WITH CONDITIONS.
END SUMMARY
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1. HAD USEFUL HOUR'S TALK AUG 20 WITH SAUDI SECURITY CHIEF SHAIKH
KAMAL ADHAM WHO IS HERE ON ONE ON HIS PERIODIC VISITS TO KUWAIT.
I BEGAN BY SAYING I UNDERSTOOD SAUDIS UNHAPPY WITH KUWAITIS BOTH
BECAUSE OF KUWAITI POLICY OF ASSISTANCE TO PDRH AND SHAIKH SABAH'S

RECENT VISIT TO LOWER GULF STATES AND OMAN. ADHAM REPLIED SAG HAD NO MAJOR PROBLEM WITH KUWAIT THAT COULD NOT BE SOLVED BY ENGAGING IN A LITTLE ADVANCE CONSULTATION AND COORDINATION. KUWAITIS SHOULD HAVE DISCUSSED FONMIN'S TRIP TO LOWER GULF IN ADVANCE WITH SAG BOTH BECAUSE SUCH MAJOR ACTIVITY IN GULF OBVIOUSLY AFFECTED SAUDI ARABIAN AS WELL AS KUWAITI AND GULF STATES' INTERESTS AND BECAUSE WITH SAUDI BLESSING FONMIN'S TRIP WOULD HAVE BEEN VASTLY MORE EFFECTIVE AND USEFUL. AS FAR AS KUWAIT AID TO PDRY WAS CONCERNED, ADHAM SAID, ESSENTIAL POINT WAS WHETHER SUCH AID LESSENED OR STRENGTHENED PDRY PROCLIVITIES FOR MISCHIEF. SAG NOT ABOUT TO ABANDON ITS CONFRONTATION APPROACH TO PDRY BUT AT SAME TIME SAW MERIT IN ATTACKING PROBLEM OF PDRY SUBVERSION FROM MORE THAN ONE VIEWPOINT. IN KUWAITI APPROACH, THROUGH TRYING PROVIDE ALTERNATIVE TO SOUTH YEMENI DEPENDENCE ON COMMUNISTS AND OFFER TO TALK TO DHOFARI REBELS (KUWAIT 2715), WAS AIMED AT REVERSAL OF PRESENT PDRY SUBVERSION OF NEIGHBORS AND SHOWED SIGNS OF SUCCEEDING, SAG WOULD NOT OPPOSE IT. IN THIS CONNECTION, ADHAM SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN DIRECTED BY FAISAL TO TELL KUWAITIS THAT (A) KING BELIEVED CLOSE FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT

IMPORTANT TO BOTH COUNTRIES AND (B) FACT THAT KUWAIT APPROACHED PROBLEMS IN AREA FROM DIFFERENT ANGLE THAN THAT OF SAUDI ARABIA WAS ASSET RATHER THAN LIABILITY AS LONG AS TWO COUNTRIES WERE PURSUING SAME BASIC AIMS. ADHAM SAID KUWAITIS REACTED VERY WELL TO HIS PRESENTATION. I SAID I THOUGHT THIS EXAMPLE OF FIRST CLASS STATESMANSHIP ON PART KING FAISAL.

2. I ASKED ADHAM WHETHER ZAYYID'S OFFER HELP OUT IN VARIOUS WAYS IN YEMEN WAS CAUSING SAUDIS ANY HEARTBURN. "ABSOLUTELY NOT", ADHAM REPLIED WITH FEELING. "WE WELCOME ANYONE WILLING SHARE BURDEN OF YEMEN WITH US."

3. I ARGUED STRONGLY WITH ADHAM FOR SAUDI RECOGNITION OF UAE. SAID I THOUGHT UAE HELD GREATEST IMMEDIATE POTENTIAL FOR IN-SECURITY IN GULF, AND LACK OF SAUDI-UAE RELATIONS WAS SERIOUS GAP
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IN GENERAL GULF SECURITY PICTURE. SAUDI DEALINGS DIRECTLY WITH RAS AL-KHAIMA, WHILE EFFECTIVE IN DIVERTING SHAIKH SAQR FROM IRAQ, WAS DIVISIVE FACTOR WITHIN UAE, ESPECIALLY SINCE SAQR INHAPPY WITH HIS "INFERIOR" POSITION IN UAE COUNCILS. IN ANSWER ADHAM'S QUESTION AS TO WHY ZAYID DID NOT WIN SAQR OVER WITH MONEY, I TOLD HIM ZAYID DID NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD EVER BE POSSIBLE BRING SAQR NTIRLY INTO FOLD, BUT THAT SUGGESTION TO INCLUDE SAQR'S SON KHALID IN KEY UAEG POST SEEMED TO APPEAL TO ZAYID. ADHAM SAID

HE AGREED THAT EXCELLENT IDEA.

4. I SAID ZAYID STRUCK ME AS PERSON WHO WANTED DO RIGHT THING BUT RATHER TOO IMPRESSED BY WHOMEVER HE HAD LAST TALKED TO. FOR THIS REASON IT NECESSARY TO BE ON SPOT ALL THE TIME. IRAN'S DECISION

RECOGNIZE UAE AND ASSIGN AMBASSADOR THERE HAD PAID IMPORTANT DIVIDENDS INCLUDING APPARENTLY MUZZLING ZAYID ON SUBJECT OF SEIZED ISLANDS. PRESENCE OF STRONG SAUDI AMBASSADOR IN ABU DHABI COULD ALSO HAVE PROFOUND EFFECT ON ZAYID'S THINKING, AND I SAID I BELIEVED EXISTENCE SAUDI-UAE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WOULD ENHANCE RATHER THAN WEAKEN PROSPECTS FOR BORDER SETTLEMENT BETWEEN TWO. ADHAM REPLIED "I WISH ZAYID WOULD HELP SETTLE ISLANDS QUESTION INSTEAD OF LEAVING THIS PROBLEM ON OUR BACKS." HOWEVER, HE ADDED, HE AGREED ZAYID NEEDED GOOD AND STEADY ADVICE AND SAUDI INPUT IMPORTANT.

5. WE BROKE NO NEW GROUND ON SUBJECT OF SAUDI-ABU DHABI DISPUTE, ADHAM MAINTAINING THAT FAISAL CONSIDERED HE HAD MADE ZAYID OFFER HE COULD NOT REFUSE. IF PROBLEM WAS OIL INCOME, ADHAM SAID, THAT COULD BE ARRANGED. I REPLIED IN MY OPINION ISSUE WAS UNFORTUNATELY MORE ONE OF TERRITORY AND PERSONAL PRESTIGE IN ZAYID'S MIND. ADHAM MERELY SHOOK HIS HEAD. I ASKED ADHAM WHAT SAUDI REACTION WOULD BE

TO OFFER BY ZAYID OF NARROW CORRIDOR TO SEA BETWEEN QATAR AND ABU DHABI. ADHAM SAID HE THOUGHT THAT MIGHT BE HELPFUL. IN ANY CASE, HE SAID, BURAIMI WAS NO LONGER A PROBLEM.

6. I ASKED ADHAM WHETHER IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR SAUDI ARABIA TO OFFER TO RECOGNIZE UAE ON BASIS THAT RECOGNITION WAS WITHOUT PREJUDICE IN ANY WAY TO SAUDI CLAIMS ALONG ABU DHABI BORDER. ADHAM ASKED IF THERE WERE ANY PRECEDENT FOR SUCH A PROCEDURE. I SAID I DID NOT KNOW BUT WOULD CHECK. ADHAM SAID HE THOUGHT
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IDEA WORTH PURSUING.

7. COMMENT: IN CHAT LATER WITH BRIT AMB WILTON, HE TOLD ME BRITISH

HAVE FORMULA FOR RECOGNITION WHICH IN EFFECT ACKNOWLEDGES A GOVERNMENT'S RIGHT AND ABILITY TO RULE BUT DOES NOT NECESSARILY IMPLY RECOGNITION OF BORDERS AND, OBVIOUSLY, DOES NOT IMPLY AGREEMENT WITH ALL THAT GOVT'S POLICIES. I ASSUME OUR CONCEPT OF RECOGNITION IS SIMILAR. I SUGGEST DEPT STUDY THIS MATTER WITH VIEW (A) TO COMING UP WITH FORMULA FOR RECOGNITION THAT SAUDIS AND UAE MIGHT BE ABLE LIVE WITH, I.E. THAT DOES NOT PREJUDICE THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS ON BORDER DISPUTE AND (B) TO FINDING ANY PRECEDENTS IN HISTORY FOR RECOGNITION WITH CONDITIONS ATTACHED. PROPOSITION MAY BE LONG SHOT BUT SURELY IT WORTH A TRY. MOREOVER, IT IS IN AN AREA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE IN WHICH USG MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP WITHOUT GETTING INTO SUBSTANCE OF DISPUTE ITSELF.
STOLTZFUS

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